Diplomat in Berlin 1933-1939, Papers and Memoirs, by Josef Lipski and Waclaw Jedrejewicz. 1968
Monument to Hitler: The “Lipski Endorsed Holocaust” Canard. 1938 Teschen (Cieszyn) and Bentschen (Zbaszyn) Facts. German Guilt Diffusion, Already Early Post-WWII
Jozef Lipski practically had resistance to German expansionism in his blood. He was born in Breslau before it once again became Wroclaw. His relatives had been active in counteracting German repressive policies in Prussian-occupied Poland.
A MONUMENT TO HITLER: LIPSKI NEVER SUPPORTED NAZI PERSECUTION OF JEWS!
The much-misquoted Lipski proposal to construct a monument to Hitler, were Hitler to solve the Jewish problem, needs to be understood correctly. (p. 411). It was not an endorsement of Nazi persecution of Jews and most certainly not an endorsement of the Holocaust—something not even imagined at the time! It was a proposal to get large numbers of Jews to emigrate from Poland and other countries, an idea enjoying broad-based support, including (yes) from many Jews, notably the Zionists.
THE LIPSKI MONUMENT TO HITLER PROPOSAL IN PROPER CONTEXT
Apropos to the Lipski proposal, Jedrejewicz comments, (quote) The Jews living in rural areas made their living as agricultural brokers. However, as agricultural cooperatives developed in Poland, these middlemen were no longer needed and the Jews were deprived of their means of livelihood; they were left destitute and with no means of support. This had nothing to do with anti-Semitism; it was solely a natural economic development. The Jews in Poland, with their traditional clannishness, posed a serious problem in the overpopulated Polish state. The Polish government felt that a partial solution to this problem would be for them to emigrate, primarily to Palestine. The matter was considered so serious that Polish delegates to the League of Nations, in October, 1936, insisted that some immediate solution would have to be found, one possibility being the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine…(unquote)(p. 411).
THE DEEP PRE-NAZI ROOTS OF GERMAN POLONOPHOBIA
German enmity towards the resurrected Polish state long predated Hitler’s rise to power. (e. g, p. 20-on). Alfred Wysocki, who in 1931-1932 had preceded Lipski as diplomat, encountered constant hostility, along with insinuations that Poland was nothing more than a temporary anomaly (Saisonstaat, or seasonal state). The attacks on Poland that had characterized the WWI-era German-Jewish symbiosis continued: “Journalists of Jewish origin played quite an important role this campaign, clad in the long robes of defenders of ‘threatened Germany’; attacking Poland they tried to safeguard their own position in the face of ever-growing nationalistic feelings.” (p. 43; see also p. 80).
NAZI GERMAN PRETENSIONS OF BENEVOLENCE TOWARDS POLAND [LIKE THOSE OF TODAY’S GERMANY]
For a time, Polish-German relations seemed to improve. Goering tried to convince the Poles that the Nazis were a “new breed” of Germans that had broken with the ALLDEUTSCH expansionist ambitions of their Junker-inspired forebears. (p. 112).
ZBASZYN (BENTSCHEN): THE MYTH OF POLAND-REJECTED POLISH JEWS
The Polish hesitation of accepting the German-expelled Jews at the border town of Zbaszyn (October 1938) has been portrayed as a heartless Polish act driven (what else?) anti-Semitism. Actually, these former Polish citizens often had no connection with Poland. The Polish side threatened to retaliate expelling the same number of Germans (pp. 461-462).
HUNTING PARTIES WITH THE NAZIS DID NOT IMPLY AN ENDORSEMENT OF NAZISM!
Now consider the oft-mentioned hunting parties, which have been misrepresented as manifestations of Polish coziness with the Nazi regime. There is no evidence that they were anything more than diplomatic courtesies. Goering was often the host at shooting parties, with Lipski an outstanding marksman. (p. xi, 556). Lipski also hosted these events. (p. 286, 307).
NAZI GERMANY EXPLOITED POLAND’S MINORITIES FOR HER OWN ENDS [LIKE THE EUROPEAN UNION DOES TODAY]
For some time, Germany had been supporting irredentist movements among Poland’s minorities. Negotiations involving Lipski were aimed at ending Germany’s support of the Ukrainian fascist-separatist OUN. This led to the arrest, in Germany, of Mykola Lebed, who was later sentenced to death in Poland for his role in the assassination of Bronislaw Pieracki. His death sentence was reduced to life imprisonment. (pp. 141-142). (Several years later, after his release following the fall of Poland, Lebed returned the favor, of the Polish sparing of his life, becoming one of the chief organizers of the OUN-UPA genocide of Poles in German-occupied Poland.).
DEMYSTIFYING THE SO-CALLED POLISH 1938 “SEIZURE” OF TESCHEN
Poland’s annexation of Teschen (Cieszyn) was in no way a Polish endorsement of Nazi aggression against Czechoslovakia. It was a means of protecting the Poles from this tiny border area, a negligible fraction of Czechoslovakia’s geographic area that happened to have a Polish majority, from falling under Nazi German rule. (e. g., p. 423).
GERMANY ATTACKS POLAND, AND LIPSKI PERSONALLY STICKS IT TO THE GERMANS
At the dawn of WWII, Goering expressed regret to Lipski about being required to lead the Luftwaffe against Poland. Lipski retorted that he would have to join the military and shoot them down. He did. Although well past regular military age, Lipski, having gotten out of burning Poland, underwent rigorous training and joined the Polish Army in France. His unit is credited with downing a German plane. (pp. xi-xii).
EARLY MANIFESTATIONS OF GERMAN GUILT DIFFUSION AT POLAND’S EXPENSE
No sooner had the Third Reich been defeated than even non-Nazi Germans began a new propaganda campaign to try to blame Poland, in whole or in part, for the start of WWII. Lipski soundly debunks this. For instance, far from fearing the British-Polish alliance as some kind of danger or provocation, Hitler had (correctly) scoffed at its hollowness. Several days before attacking Poland, the Fuhrer quipped that England was unwilling to spend eight million pounds to help Poland rearm, while freely paying a half billion pounds into China. (p. 589).
Against the argument that Poland was unreasonable about Danzig (Gdansk), Lipski quoted Hitler (May 23, 1939), “‘Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of extending our living space.’” (p. 651). In fact, Hitler had talked about the perceived German need for lebensraum on many previous occasions. (e. g., pp. 64-65; 310-311).
THE MYTH OF POLAND MALTREATING HER GERMAN MINORITY
Lipski exposes the complete fraudulence of German accusations of Poland mistreating its German minority, as also verified outside observers. (pp. 645-648). Even in earlier Nazi times, the Polish minority in Germany never had as many rights as the German minority in Poland! (p. 288). With Nazi racism and DEUTSCHTUM in full bloom, Polish minority rights faced further curtailment, while the German minority in Poland was stirred up against Poland (p. 645), culminating in fifth-column activities. (p. 648)