• The Rape of Poland: Pattern of Soviet Aggression
  by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk – Published September 10th 2010 by Kessinger Publishing

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Kielce Pogrom Staging: The Circumstantial Evidence. Why Poles Were Not Thrilled When Holocaust-Surviving Jews Came Back to Reclaim Their Property

This work is a classic. I focus on a few issues that have relevance to this day.

POLAND’S SUBJUGATION: A FOREGONE CONCLUSION

This book provides a mini-history of Poland of the tragic wartime and postwar years. The Soviet puppet state had been the combined result of the west’s sellout of Poland and the progressive subjugation of Poland by Communists. The sham elections of 1947 were just icing on the cake. Those who blame Mikolajczyk for the imposition of Communism on Poland are engaging in a case of blaming the victim. There is, in fact, ample evidence that the Soviets had at no time intended to respect Polish sovereignty. Already in 1941, not long after the German attack on its erstwhile ally Russia and ensuing Polish-Soviet „reconciliation”, the Soviets were already parachuting Communist agitators into Poland (p. 42). The only question was how far Stalin would go (or, more accurately, how far the west would let him go).

DID THE WEST STILL NEED STALIN?

Interestingly, Mikolajczyk (p. 118) relates a conversation he had with Churchill during which the latter pointed out that the west no longer needed the USSR in order to defeat Japan. This undercuts the rationalization, commonly voiced by apologists for President Roosevelt, that the betrayal of Poland had been necessary for guaranteed and essential Soviet participation in the defeat of Japan.

MOST „POLISH COLLABORATION” WAS FORCED

Mikolajczyk writes, „In that section of Poland which Hitler had incorporated into the Third Reich, there had been…Polish youths plunged into the Todt organization and–at gunpoint–into the German Army.”(p. 122).

NOT ONLY JEWISH PROPERTY: POLISH PROPERTY WAS ALSO CONFISCATED

All Polish properties were seized and turned over to Germans in those parts of German-conquered Poland annexed into the Reich (p. 15, 122). During the first and second Soviet occupations of Poland, large numbers of Polish properties were looted and shipped to Russia (p. 119). Obviously, Poles were situated in an atmosphere of disrespect for both life AND property. The postwar Poles’ displeasure with former Jewish owners coming back to reclaim their properties, and the Poles occasional murder of Jews in this regard (300-600 murders out of some 300,000 returning Jews), trumpeted by Jan T. Gross, thus finds at least a measure of understanding. (There was also a severe shortage of housing after the war).

KIELCE „POGROM” STAGED: THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

The Kielce and related „pogroms” have gotten a great deal of renewed one-sided media attention as a result of the publication of FEAR, by Jan T. Gross. Decades ago, Mikolajczyk had described the Communist staging of these tragic events: „Attacks on Jewish populations were simultaneously ordered in the hope of diverting the attention of the west from the boldly corrupt Referendum. In Czestochowa the people were told that a camel–part of the Red Army’s livestock–would be displayed in the market place. When the people had gathered to view the animal, Security Police raced through the crowd shouting, `The Jews are killing our people!’ A riot was narrowly averted by a quick-thinking priest who stood up and branded the shouting as a provocation.” (p. 167). The actions of the priest add to the refutation of Jan Thomas Gross’ charge that the church was lax in responding to postwar „pogroms”.

Mikolajczyk (p. 167) continues: „In Kielce, Major Sobczynski, the Security Police officer responsible for the murder of Kojder in Rzeszow, now ordered foundry workers to gather at a certain time in the market place for a meeting. His plan was to point to a Jewish boarding house that fronted on the market place and to have his operatives shout that Polish children were being killed there. Major Sobczynski hoped to produce a rush on the building, in which case the army would open fire on the crowd. This would add to the terror of the times. But the Communists had forgotten to remove the telephone from the boardinghouse. A rabbi, informed that a mob was being provoked to attack the place, phoned the local army headquarters to appeal for protection. Troops soon arrived under the command of a Russian colonel. The colonel–who was, of course, familiar with the entire plot–was surprised to see the crowd on which his men were scheduled to fire had not as yet gathered. He had to change his plans. Lacking all pity, he sent his men against the boardinghouse, killing forty-one of its Jewish occupants and wounding forty others. In the hope of arousing the impending crowd to an over act against the army he ordered the dead thrown into the streets. Any movement of the crowd would have been his cue to shoot into the gathering. The workers, however, crossed everybody up by escaping while en route to the scene of their intended slaughter.”

LOW-CLASS POLES–THE CHAMOKOMUNA–WAS THE ENGINE OF THE KIELCE POGROM

Apart from the Communist setup, the low character of most members of the Communist terror police (the U. B., or Bezpieka) was also a factor in the „pogroms”: „The Security Police are mostly Russian-trained. Many are Russian citizens who, though dressed in Polish uniforms, cannot speak the Polish language…The country’s [Poland’s] worst criminal elements have supplied others; persons chosen for sadist tendencies or eager to join because of a psychopathic lust for a revolver’s power and the authority of a uniform…Even some Polish-speaking Germans, formerly members of Hitler’s party and S. S. battalions; are serving with the Polish Security Police.” (p. 233). In addition: „The Communists tightened their hold on Poland with two bold moves at the meeting of the temporary parliament late in April, 1946…they legalized the formation of a „voluntary” citizens militia called „ORMO”, which permitted them eventually to arm 120,000 hand-picked thugs and ex-convicts, who helped to expand and make more efficient the work of the Security Police.” (p. 156).

JAN GROSS IS WRONG–AGAIN

Besides presenting valuable historical context, Mikolajczyk’s old testimony adds to the refutation of Jan T. Gross’ ridiculous charge that Polish writers were afraid to discuss these (so-called) pogroms until recently.

Jan Peczkis